More Naked Gun than Top Gun – Guardian Online

Posted by Kuji on June 26th, 2008

The cream of US military intelligence last week had their bungled attempt to prosecute a bedroom hacker thrown out by a British court. Duncan Campbell discovers why the spooks are firing blanks in the infowar
More Naked Gun than Top Gun

THE THREE year long case of the world?s most notorious ?information warfare? attack on US government computer systems collapsed last Friday. On a grey morning in a south London court, a 23-year-old computer programmer from Cardiff walked free as crown prosecutors told the judge it wasn’t worth the cost of trying to hold his trial. They acknowledged that he had posed no threat to security.

But Matthew Bevan, who was obsessed with the X-Files and the search for alien spacecraft, and his 16-year-old accomplice, Richard Pryce, had achieved a notoriety out of all proportion to their actions. They were “Kuji” and “Datastream Cowboy” hackers whose haphazard penetration of US Air Force and defence contractors’ computers have been portrayed since 1994 as the work of foreign agents and the greatest electronic danger yet to hit the US Air Force on its home turf.

The collapse of Bevan’s trial has exposed the US infowarriors. On the back of overblown rhetoric and oversold threats, they have won lavish funding from Congress for new military and intelligence “infowar” units, and recently sold their security services to private corporations.

But the inside story of the Bevan and Pryce cases shows their forensic work to have been so poor it would have been unlikely to have stood up in court and convicted Bevan. The public portrayal of the two Britons as major threats to US national security was pure hype.

The case began in April 1994, when computer managers at an obscure US Air Force base at Rome, New York State, noticed that some of their computers had been penetrated via the Net. Over the next few weeks, a team of 50 infowar experts combed USAF and other computers to try to track the interlopers.

In May 1994, a USAF investigator told the Senate that the duo had “downloaded large volumes of data from penetrated systems”. But the computer used by Pryce to hack the US Air Force systems had already been discovered and seized by Scotland Yard. It was an aging 486 with a midget 170Mb hard disk. Bevan was no better equipped.

Although the two did allegedly download one or two classified files, those who have studied the detailed evidence in the case say that their approach was entirely haphazard and (so far as Bevan was concerned) motivated by the belief that a captured alien spacecraft, held secretly at the remote Nevada airbase Area 51 (as featured in last year?s film Independence Day), was reality.

In 1994, Bevan?s activities drew attention not in Nevada but Texas. Close to San Antonio is the Medina Annex of Lackland Air Force Base. Here, Air Force staff of the Consolidated Security Operations Center process communications from around the world. Like the real Area 51, Medina is one of the US government?s highest security facilities. San Antonio is home to the Electronic Security Command, the US Air Force section of the intelligence agency NSA. It also now hosts an Information Warfare Centre.

When on March 28, 1994 the emergency call came from New York to San Antonio, the infowar team were alerted to defend their country. Captain Kevin Ziese, chief of Advanced Counter Measures Research for the Infowar Centre, led a six-strong team whose members or so he told Fortune magazine “slept under their desks for three weeks, hacking backwards” until Pryce was arrested.

Since then, Ziese has hit the US lecture circuit and privatised his infowar business. As the WheelGroup corporation of San Antonio, he now sells ‘friendly’ hacking services to top US corporations.

Meanwhile in Britain, the case against Bevan fell apart because testimony from Ziese and others wasn’t going to stand up in court. ‘Much of the US evidence would have collapsed on detailed scrutiny,’ according to Peter Sommer, the LSE computer security and Internet expert who advised the defence teams for both men. Much of the ‘evidence’ they gave to the Crown Prosecution Service was not valid evidence at all, but e-mails of edited files that had been relayed to Ziese and others.

Ziese?s technical investigation quickly ran dry, even after his team inserted their own anti-hacking and monitoring tools onto the Net. They had discovered that the hackers were entering USAF systems from two private Net sites, Cyberspace in Seattle and Mindvox in New York.

But where were the hackers really coming from? To answer that question, the USAF team obtained legitimate accounts on the Cyberspace computer. They used these to launch snooper programs codenamed Stethoscope and Pathfinder at the Cyberspace computer. It failed, as it could not determine how the hackers were phoning into Cyberspace.

US investigators have claimed the programs they used were legal because they did not access information that other users could not get. But they have refused to produce the programs.

Traditional police methods, not arcane infowar techniques, identified Pryce. A hacker who was an undercover informant had chatted to Pryce a few weeks earlier. Pryce had used his hacker name and given the informant his London phone number. Scotland Yard?s Computer Crimes Unit were soon at Pryce?s door with a search warrant. Bevan was eventually located in a similar way. His phone number was on Pryce?s computer. Had it not been for Scotland Yard, the relatively innocuous Pryce and Bevan would never have been found ? and the US Senate would still be hearing about ?cyberterrorists? from faraway lands.

A further flaw in the USAF evidence appeared in May, when they refused to let defence experts examine and test programs they had used to monitor the Net. ?Worst of all,? says Sommer, ?having set traps to catch hackers, they neglected to produce ?before? and ?after? file dumps of the target computers.?

In the end, all the Americans handed over was patchy and circumstantial evidence that their computers had been hacked from Britain. To have attempted to fill in the holes in the evidence could have meant flying two dozen USAF witnesses to Britain to face lengthy and embarrassing cross-examination.

UK SPYMASTER SAYS TOO MANY SPOOKS SPOIL THE PLOT

British business security chiefs were last week lectured on the risks and realities of infowar at a conference on Business Crime and Risk at the Royal Society of Arts in London. But the highlight of the meeting was an unexpected call for British intelligence agencies to be cut down and realigned.

David Bickford was legal adviser to the intelligence and security services from 1987 until 1995, where he taught MI5 how to turn its work into evidence that its agents could present in court ? skills that the US Air Force could do well to catch up with.

Bickford said that British intelligence ?is not doing its job properly?. The ?750 million a year cost of maintaining three intelligence agencies ? the Security Service (MI5), Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) and GCHQ (responsible for electronic eavesdropping) ? was now completely unjustified. There was ?triplication of management, triplication of bureaucracy and triplication of turf battles?.

As a result, British intelligence was now turning ?a blind eye to the fact that economic crime, including organised racketeering in narcotics, kidnap, extortion, product contamination and fraud, now poses the greatest threat to the security of the international community?.

Bickford revealed that, in 1995, the intelligence agencies had secretly suggested to the Major government that they develop links to large companies in order to provide them with ?protective business intelligence?. The plan was turned down. Officially, it was claimed that the problem was distinguishing between ?protective intelligence? and economic espionage. But the truth, he suggested, was that MI5, MI6 and GCHQ had bickered about how to finance and run the proposed new scheme.

Until difficulties like this were hammered out, said Bickford, taxpayers? funds would be wasted and business damaged by the unavailability of important information that was kept only in government hands. A merger now would save ‘tens of millions of pounds’, and provide for the ‘focused direction, integration and analysis of electronic and human intelligence to reduce risk’, he added.

A cabinet office team is currently doing a year-long review of the structure of British intelligence. Their review should be ?quite fierce?, suggested Bickford.

Internal threats had all but disappeared ? and with them the raison d?etre of MI5. The main threat to Britain now was ‘serious economic crime’ and ‘super-terrorism’, involving the use of weapons of mass destruction, he said. Because of ‘the common international nature of these threats’, arguments for having three different intelligence services ‘falls at the first hurdle’.

Not only were ‘operational officers with long experience in intelligence’ being lost to the private sector, others were lost because they had to take up management posts instead of carrying on in intelligence. Tax payers were having to pay for this ‘waste of experience’, Bickford claimed.

A new ?national intelligence agency? should be formed, he added, in order to provide protective business intelligence. It could even charge for its services. It was ?long overdue? for the Parliamentary Intelligence Oversight Committee to instigate the process of amalgamating the three agencies.

Hostility and in-fighting between MI5 and MI6 has long been notorious. The situation only began to change in the mid-1970s, when the two agencies formed a joint section to fight Irish terrorism. Since 1990, MI5 has seen its traditional concerns of Soviet espionage and so-called ?internal subversion? all but vanish. Faced with the additional threat of a ceasefire in Ireland, MI5 has sought to move into police areas including fraud, money laundering, narcotics and organised crime. MI6 and GCHQ have also been retargeted into these areas.

Bickford?s call for more intelligence and security expertise for business was backed by Sir Peter Imbert, former Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, and other senior ex-police officers.

While legal adviser to MI5 and MI6, Bickford helped draft the legislation that brought the once officially invisible organisations ‘in from the cold’ and put them on a statutory legal basis. Since leaving the agencies, Bickford has attacked the government?s willingness to allow British offshore islands to remain as tax havens, claiming that this constituted tacit support for money laundering and organised crime.

[Duncan Campbell is a freelance writer and broadcaster, and not the Guardian?s crime correspondent of the same name]

26 November 1997

US Air force lets british hacker walk – Tabloid

Posted by Kuji on June 26th, 2008

SAN FRANCISCO (TABLOID NEWS SERVICES) — One of cyberspace’s most shocking cases of hacking came to a pathetic close late last week when all the charges had to be dropped against a London kid who made himself famous by breaking into the Pentagon and touching off a nuclear weapons panic in the U.S. Air Force.

British prosecutors said it’s a waste of time and money to continue trying to convict 23-year-old Matthew “Kuji” Bevan, a hacker who made world headlines in 1995 when he was arrested along with his 16-year-old cohort Richard Pryce, aka “Datastream Cowboy.”

Led by Pryce, the pair apparently broke into U.S. military computers at the Griffiss Air Force Base in New York and accessed sensitive weapons information. And from there they hopped over to the computers of a nuclear research facility on the Korean peninsula.

U.S. military officials were so confused by the two hackers they thought at least one of Bevan’s break-ins was the work of an Eastern European spy ring. And when the military saw that the intruders had used USAF computers to hack a link into the Korean military site, then copy information back on the USAF computers, they were positively panicked. The military cyber-cops didn’t know if the Korean computers were in North or South Korea — and they feared the hack would be seen by crazy Communist North Korea as an act of war.

According to the tech news service Newsbytes, the incident touched off a “diplomatic crisis” between the U.S. and South Korea, where the facility turned out to be located, although other reports have portrayed the pair’s adventures as mostly harmless.

It was an embarrassing shock to U.S. military’s cyber cops when it was revealed that their online assailants were a pair of bored London kids.

When cops arrived to arrest Pryce at his parents’ home in 1995, he reportedly curled up in a ball on the floor and cried.

Pryce was fined nearly $2,000 for the crime back in 1996, but Bevan’s case dragged on until last week.

It finally ran out of steam when British prosecutors realized they weren’t going to get any help from their American colleagues, according to Newsbytes.

The case was dumped when the court and prosecutors were told that classified military information would be made public during the trial, and that the case would be incredibly expensive to prosecute. Witnesses would have to be flown from the U.S. and the technical details would take months to explain, the court heard.

Worse, the government was pretty sure it would lose, because the U.S. was refusing to turn over information about how it traced and identified the hackers.

“The U.S. cyber sleuth teams simply did not understand the difference between conducting a technical investigation and producing robust admissible evidence,” said Peter Sommer, a senior fellow at the London School of Economics’ Computer Security Research Center, according to Newsbytes. Sommer testified as a defense expert for both Pryce and Bevan.

Sommer said the U.S. government had flubbed the case from the start. The government detectives “neglected to produce ‘before’ and ‘after’ file dumps of the target computers,” Sommer said. Such raw data dumps could show what changed the hackers made while they had access to the USAF systems.

And the Americans refused to turn over the source code to the software it used to monitor the hackers’ attacks. Without that, the court would have no opportunity to test the software to make sure it was working right.

Bevan left the court last week without talking to reporters. The only word came from his lawyers, who said the young man was happy it was over.

Ex-hacker to help Nintendo with viral marketing

Posted by Kuji on June 26th, 2008

Ex-hacker to help Nintendo with viral marketing
By: John Leyden
Posted: 29/03/2001 at 14:44 GMT

A well-known former computer hacker has been hired to do viral marketing for games firm Nintendo and TV channel E4.

Mathew Bevan, whose hacker handle is Kuji, was accused of breaking into US military computer systems but escaped without punishment when a 1997 case at Woolwich Crown Court was dropped after a long-running legal battle.

After the case Bevan became an ethical hacker and security consultant with Tiger Computer Security, and later on a freelance basis with his firm the Kuji Media Corporation.

Bevan was reluctant to go into details of his marketing work just yet, but said he was offered work for Nintendo and the E4 site, e4chained, through a third party and the Kuji Media Corporation. As a security expert it was felt he had the talent to help run a successful viral marketing campaign.

Bevan, and Richard Pryce (Datastream Cowboy) were accused of hacking into a research centre at Griffiss Air Force base in New York state and faced charges related to the Computer Misuse Act.

The case revolved an incident when the Korean Atomic Research Institute’s database was found to have had been deposited on USAF’s systems.

In court, USAF investigators admitted that they initially feared the data had come from North Korea – something that could spark a major international incident. This provoked fears that World War III might be started by a teenage computer hacker sitting in his bedroom.

An inquiry into the hack led investigators to Bevan and Pryce, who were subsequently charged.

Pryce, who was 16 at the time, was fined £1,200 in a hearing before the Woolwich Crown Court case. The prosecution against Bevan was dropped because after the leniency shown to Pryce, prosecutors concluded it was too expensive to continue with the case. ?

Hacking U.S. Government Computers from Overseas

Posted by Kuji on June 26th, 2008

Foreign hackers working from overseas via the Internet penetrated sensitive U.S. Government computer systems.

Hacking U.S. Government Computers from Overseas

Foreign-based hacker groups working via the Internet have had substantial success breaking into U.S. Government and defense contractor computer systems holding sensitive but not classified information. There is one publicly known case in which computer break-ins from overseas were sponsored by a foreign intelligence service.

Three Germans in Bremen, West Germany were hired by the Soviet KGB during 1986- 1989 to hack into U.S. Government systems. They penetrated Pentagon systems, NASA networks, Los Alamos National Laboratories and Lawrence Berkeley Laboratories. They were detected by Clifford Stoll, at Berkeley, when he checked out minor discrepancies in the account billings. Stoll later wrote the popular book, The Cuckoo’s Egg, about the case. The three hackers were arrested and convicted of espionage.

The following three cases also show the ability of hackers overseas to penetrate protected domestic U.S. systems via the Internet. In these three cases there was some suspicion of possible foreign intelligence involvement. This could not be confirmed, but also could not be ruled out. Enterprising foreign hackers could collect this information on their own and then sell it to a foreign intelligence service, or a foreign service could sponsor the same kind of operation itself.

Argentine Hacker Intrusion Into Navy Systems

In July 1995 computers in several states and Mexico reported intrusions originating from Harvard University. The hacker apparently lifted user IDs and password information from accounts on a system administered by the university. The U.S. government became concerned in August when an intrusion was detected on a network operated by the U.S. Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center (NCCOSC). The intruder broke into the NCCOSC computer and installed sniffer programs to capture the IDs and passwords of legitimate users, and other software that would allow him to alter or destroy network files or to make them inaccessible to users.

After attacking a site in Taiwan, the intruder was monitored while “chatting” on the Internet, using the name Griton. Griton was traced back to Argentina where the moniker was known by Argentine authorities as a computer pirate who specialized in hacking, cracking and phreaking. The subject was soon traced to Buenos Aires and identified as Julio Cesar Ardita, then a 21-year-old student in Buenos Aires at the University of Argentina.

According to news reports, this hacker gained access to a host computer at the Army Research Lab in Edgewood, Maryland; the Naval Research Laboratory in Washington; the California Institute of Technology in Pasadena, California; and the NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory. Victim sites include 62 U.S. government, 136 U.S. educational, and 31 U.S. commercial facilities. The U.S. Navy, NASA, and Department of Energy’s National Laboratories were high on the list of frequency of penetration.

Ardita was served a warrant and his computer was seized. He admitted responsibility, but claimed he was guilty only of mischief. He was arraigned in December, 1995. The U.S. Department of Justice filed criminal charges against Ardita. Prosecution in the U.S. was initially frustrated by the fact that computer crime is not covered by international agreements for extradition. In December 1997, Ardita agreed to come voluntarily to the United States and plead guilty to unlawfully intercepting electronic communications over a military computer and damaging files on a military computer. In return for Ardita’s agreement to come voluntarily to the United States, he is being sentenced to only three years probation and fined $5,000.1

Although he hacked into important and sensitive government research files on satellites, radiation, and energy-related engineering, Ardita is not accused of obtaining classified information related to national security. To counterintelligence analysts, the hacker’s selection of targets and subject matter suggested a well-defined intelligence collection tasking, but foreign intelligence involvement has not been established. If a foreign intelligence service was involved, it is impossible to know which one, as many countries might have been interested in the information Ardita collected.

The Ardita case was the first time a court-ordered wire tap was used for real-time monitoring of an unknown subject to catch a computer criminal. It demonstrates the ability to chase and identify an international hacker on-line.1

Air Force Rome Development Center Break-In

Two young British hackers, Richard Pryce, age 16, and Mathew Bevan, age 21, broke into U.S. military computer systems. Pryce, who was identified and charged in 1995, allegedly obtained access to files on ballistic weapons research and messages from U.S. agents in North Korea during a 1994 crisis over inspection of nuclear facilities in North Korea. The penetrations were carried out over a period of several months.

Bevan, an information technology technician, was charged in 1996 with conspiracy to gain unauthorized access to computers. Pryce used the on-line nickname of “Datastream Cowboy” while Bevan identified himself as “Kuji.” Kuji was tutoring Datastream in his attempts to break into specific systems. According to news reports, investigators suspected the older culprit of being a foreign agent.

Pryce and Bevan broke into the Rome Air Development Center, Griffiss Air Force Base, NY, and before authorities became aware of their presence (five days later) they had penetrated seven systems, copied files including sensitive battlefield simulations, and installed devices to read passwords of everyone entering the systems. Rome Air Development Center was used as a launching pad for more than 150 intrusions into military, government and other systems including NASA and Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. Large volumes of data were downloaded from penetrated systems. One such data transfer (which was being monitored) involved the downloading of files from the Goddard Space Flight Center to an Internet provider in Latvia. In order to prevent the loss of sensitive data, the monitoring team broke the connection.

In one of these break-ins, Pryce used Rome to access a Korean facility. According to media reports, “For several anxious hours [U.S. authorities] didn’t know whether the intrusion was into a North or South Korean system. The concern was that the North Koreans would trace an intrusion coming from the U.S. and perceive it as an aggressive act of war.” The penetrated system turned out to be the South Korean Atomic Research Institute. The two were arrested after a long investigation by the Air Force Office of Special Investigation and New Scotland Yard.2

Dutch Teen Hackers

A group of Dutch teenagers penetrated computer systems at 34 U.S. military installations during 1990-91. They gained access to information on personnel performance reports, weapons development, and descriptions of movement of equipment and personnel. The systems penetrated included the Naval Sea Systems Command, the Army’s readiness system at Ft. Belvoir, Virginia, and the Army missile research lab at Aberdeen, Maryland.

At least one penetrated system directly supported U.S. military operations in Operation Desert Storm prior to the Gulf War. They copied or altered unclassified data and changed software to permit future access. The hackers were also looking for information about nuclear weapons. Their activities were first disclosed by Dutch television when camera crews filmed a hacker tapping into what was said to be U.S. military test information.

According to an ABC News report, the Dutch hackers had been operating for at least a year reading sensitive information about military plans and operations. Documents obtained by ABC indicate that hackers got so much information about the Patriot Missile that they had to break into several other computers just to find a place to store the data. At one point the intruders shut down computers in Wisconsin and Virginia which were later used to mobilize troops for Desert Storm. Information was gathered on the Patriot rocket launching system, the Navy’s Tomahawk cruise missile, and on the call up of military reserves for the Gulf War. The search words the hackers were particularly interested in were “military,” “nuclear” and “Desert Storm” or “Desert Shield.”

Many of the computer penetrations originated in Geldrop, Holland. At the time, investigators suspected the hackers could have been freelance spies looking for information to sell to the KGB or Iraqi intelligence, but no evidence of foreign intelligence service involvement has been found.

Cracking down on the outlaws of cyberspace

Posted by Kuji on June 26th, 2008

Cracking down on the outlaws of cyberspace Cybercop apprenticed in tough job
( USA TODAY )

What’s it take to be America’s top cybercop?

“I was a hockey referee, so I’m used to being beaten up,” suggests Jim Christy, who is among those most often mentioned for the title.

And he’s been at it for only a decade.

But it’s a decade that’s seen the Internet grow from 8,000 users to an expected 50 million at the end of this year. And it’s a decade that’s seen computer crime go from a Hollywood scriptwriter’s fantasy to a real- life threat to commerce.

As a result, it’s seen Christy trade a higher-paying post as a Pentagon computer programmer to become the military’s first full-time civilian computer crime investigator.

Today, with the weighty title of Chief of Computer Crime Investigations & Information Warfare, he is one of 68 computer investigators in the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI).

At 44, Christy’s part-time career as a professional hockey official has ended after four knee operations and a bionic eye implant necessitated by a slap shot to the head.

What he misses most, he says, is that as a referee “you are judge, jury and executioner, and justice is immediate.”

In law enforcement, justice is dispensed slowly. Especially, he notes, in cyberspace.

Christy, a Baltimore native, stumbled into the computer field. After drawing No. 35 in the draft lottery of 1971 during the Vietnam War, he joined the Air Force rather than waiting to be drafted. The aptitude test noted computer skills. He spent the next four years as a computer key punch operator, followed by 13 years as a civilian working computers at the Pentagon.

When he moved to OSI, Christy largely ceased his hands-on involvement with computers and systems.

“There are a whole lot of people who do that stuff a lot better than me,” he says.

His role now is to guide investigations — how to track the cybercriminals, who to talk to, when to get a warrant.

Christy has more experience chasing outlaws through cyberspace than anyone else. To those knowledgeable about computer crime and hackers, his cases are legend:

– He was the first investigator to take seriously Cliff Stoll’ s complaints about a 75-cent accounting error that led to the discovery of a hacker mucking about in the University of California-Berkeley computer.

The 1986 investigation eventually led to Hanover, Germany, and a group of students who were hacking into U.S. military systems and selling what they found to the Soviet KGB. Stoll describes the case in the book, The Cuckoo’s Egg.

– Christy took part in the “Morris Worm” investigation, helping track Robert Morris, whose program moved across the Internet entering and disabling individual computers and network systems, causing millions of dollars in losses.
– Christy helped solve a 1991 murder by using cardboard and tape to reassemble two floppy disks.

On the disks were love letters between Air Force Sgt. Joe Snodgrass and a lover; a letter to a pair of hitmen paid to kill Snodgrass’ wife; and a letter increasing life insurance coverage for his wife to $450,000. Snodgrass pleaded guilty and is serving life in prison.

– Christy helped solve a 1991-92 case of an Air Force colonel who used America Online to exchange child pornography with 88 others. The case yielded the first cyberspace search warrants. The colonel was convicted and dismissed from the military; no jail time was imposed.
– Christy worked on the 1994 Rome Labs case, in which a British teen-age hacker, with the guidance of a still-unidentified accomplice, cracked the security at the Rome Air Force Base in New York. The base is a premier military research facility, and the unidentified accomplice is suspected of being a foreign agent.

After weighing a series of high-tech options for chasing the hackers through cyberspace, Christy found an informant in an on-line chat room who led him to the British hacker. Charges are pending.

Since last fall, Christy has been on temporary assignment to the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, helping them examine security in cyberspace.

“I like working up on Capitol Hill, because you can make a difference, ” Christy says.

“It’s still anarchy and like the Wild West out there on the Internet, ” he continues. “But I feel much better now than I did just a year and a half ago, because the decision makers are starting to take notice. ”

Three landmark cases

In the brief history of computer crime, these three cases are regarded as landmarks:

CITIBANK BREAK-IN: Bank robbery by hackers still rare

In 1994, Citibank came under attack by a group of cyberspace thieves, led by a mathematician in St. Petersburg, Russia.

In response, the bank called SAIC, a leading international security firm in McLean, Va. SAIC eventually traced the funds to accounts in San Francisco; Amsterdam, the Netherlands; Germany; Finland; and Tel Aviv, Israel.

The attackers had worked at Citibank affiliates for up to three years before the thefts. They installed backdoors to the computer and entered when they were ready.

Eventually, all but $400,000 of the $10 million stolen was recovered, and the company tracked down the intruders. Only then was the case turned over to the FBI, which arrested Vladimir Levin and four accomplices.

It remains the only case of a computer theft reported by a bank, the FBI recently told Senate investigators.

SAIC, whose board of directors and executive offices are populated by former high-ranking members of the military and intelligence community, declined comment.

According to the FBI, Levin took advantage of accounts where clients had opted for a lower level of security. All Citibank clients are now required to use higher- level security. Levin is battling extradition to the USA.

When the case hit the media in 1995, 20 of Citibank’s largest clients were approached by other banks with claims of better security, according to a recent report by the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.

“There’s a huge disincentive to reporting these crimes,” says Mark Rasch at SAIC’s Center for Information Protection.

ARGENTINE HACKER: A tap on the Net spreads a wide net

In an investigation this past winter, authorities obtained the first court-ordered cyberspace wiretap.

The case underscores the complexities of preserving privacy rights in cyberspace.

The case involved a hacker using a Harvard University computer to steal passwords and gain access to government computers.

The problem: how to track the hacker in Harvard’s computer without listening to all the system activity, up to 300 users at a time.

Unlike a traditional wiretap, where authorities listen to a single conversation on a single phone line, in cyberspace police must review all the traffic on a system to identify the intruder’s packet of digital information.

“It’s like putting a bug (listening device) on home plate at Yankee Stadium and listening to every conversation and having to parse out the one conversation you’re looking for,” says Donald Stern, U.S. Attorney in Boston.

Investigators were able to draw a distinct profile of the intruder, such as specialized software he used. Authorities used software that monitored the Harvard system looking for that profile, alerting agents when they had a near match.

Even so, investigators twice read unrelated conversations. Authorities concede a clear profile is needed to preserve privacy rights.

“There will be cases where, no matter what you do, you will be unable to get a clear enough profile of the intruder,” says Stephen Heymann, the deputy chief of the U.S. Attorney’s criminal division in Boston.

By late December 1995, authorities say, the intruder was traced to Buenos Aires, Argentina, and identified as Julio Cesar Ardita, a computer science student. He faces U.S. charges, but Argentina won’t make an arrest.

INTEL CHIP CASE: Pentium prosecution required creativity

One of the rare cases of economic espionage that ended with a prosecution was that of Guillermo “Bill” Gaede, who pleaded guilty in March to charges of stealing the specifications for Intel’s Pentium and 486 computer chips.

Court papers set the value of the theft at $10 million to $20 million; Intel says the value could go up to $300 million.

“This is as big a case as anything we’ve seen in the ’90s,” says Leland Altschuler, chief of the U.S. Attorney’s Office in San Jose, Calif.

The Gaede case, while unique in its dimensions, was typical in another respect: It was an “inside” job, pulled off by a trusted employee with access to the computer system.

As a senior engineer at Intel in 1993-94, Gaede was able to access Intel’s computer system from his home computer.

However, Intel’s security system prevented anyone from copying files.

So Gaede set up a video camera and taped the blueprints off his computer monitor.

He sent a copy of the videotape to an Intel competitor. Instead of paying Gaede, the competitor promptly sent the video back to Intel and alerted authorities.

Intel tracked Gaede to Argentina, where the company initiated legal action. In the USA, Intel worked with the Justice Department to produce indictments against Gaede.

Gaede was captured when he returned to the USA in September 1995 to visit relatives. But, because Gaede only made a videotape of a computer file and never really stole anything in the physical sense, authorities had trouble deciding how to charge him.

Gaede pleaded guilty to mail fraud and interstate transportation of stolen property. In June, he received a 33-month sentence.

Copyright 1996, USA TODAY, a division of Gannett Co., Inc.

M.J. Zuckerman, Cracking down on the outlaws of cyberspace Cybercop apprenticed in tough job., USA TODAY, 07-02-1996, pp 04B.

Address by Paul Rodgers – PCCIP

Posted by Kuji on June 26th, 2008

Address by Paul Rodgers
Commissioner, President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection

Before the Annual Meeting and Utilities/Government Agency
Emergency Training Pilot Program
California Utilities Emergency Association

Sacramento, California
May 28, 1997

A New World of Risk

Good Afternoon:

Cyber Threats

The Rome Laboratory in New York is the Air Force’s premier command and control research facility which works on very sensitive projects such as artificial intelligence and radar guidance. In March and April 1994, a British hacker known as “Datastream Cowboy,” and another hacker, called “Kuji,” attacked Rome Lab’s computer systems over 150 times.

The hackers stole sensitive air tasking order research data. These orders are the messages military commanders send during wartime to pilots to direct and integrate their attacks on a daily basis. The hackers also launched other attacks through the lab’s computer systems, gaining access to systems at NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio, and defense contractors around the country.

Datastream Cowboy was arrested in Great Britain by Scotland Yard, but Kuji was never caught. Therefore, no one knows what happened to the data stolen from the Rome Lab.

The Rome Lab’s intrusion dramatically depicts the vulnerability of the computer age — the most far-reaching technological development of all time. The intrusion lends credence to such movies as “War Games” where a teenage hacker breaks into a Defense computer and creates great mischief.

A true story on such intrusions is told by Cliff Stoll in The Cuckoo’s Egg, a New York Times bestseller, which involved the tracking of a KGB spy ring in Hannover, Germany, from the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory through the maze of computer espionage.

Every aspect of our society is becoming linked to computer networks — from civilian government and the military, to public utilities, communications, transportation, and financial systems. These links are creating vast efficiencies in the delivery of goods and services and are giving people throughout the world greater access to information, ideas and each other. These links transcend national boundaries: Beijing and Baltimore are within a keystroke of each other.

However, as we have seen, the benign aspects of the Internet carry with them the deadly germs of vulnerability. The Government Accounting Office estimates that the Defense Department alone annually experiences over 250,000 attacks on its computers. COAST (Computer Operations, Audit, and Security Technology) at Purdue University reports that 99% of all major companies experience at least one computer incident a year, and that telecom and computer fraud and loss total almost $10 billion a year. Our computer information systems are vulnerable to electronic penetration, manipulation and damage by a range of adversaries such as teenage hackers, disgruntled employees, organized crime and hostile foreign governments.

The ground rules have changed, and the battlefield is now economic, ethnic, religious and nationalistic rather than ideological, but espionage in the 1990s springs directly from the ruins of the Cold War spy regimes. Newly configured, the secret operations of America’s enemies threaten to hollow out the U.S. economy and siphon away the jobs and technologies we need to remain competitive in the 21st century.

In the past, armies had to march, navies had to sail and air forces had to fly for great damage to be done. Today, we live in an age where the ability to induce terror comes in miniature. We are now engaged in a war that will never end. As better defenses are built, new methods of attack will be devised in an effort to penetrate them.

Since biblical times, crimes have been deterred by the prospects of punishment. Yet, information crimes, under our existing legal and enforcement regime, may sometimes have the unique characteristic that apprehension is impossible.

Physical Threats

Our critical infrastructures are threatened by terrorist bombings such as those that occurred at the New York World Trade Center in 1993 and Oklahoma City in 1995, and by natural disasters such as hurricanes, earthquakes, floods and tornadoes. The New York terrorists had even bigger plans for coordinating attacks against New York City’s bridges and tunnels and the bombing of airlines over the Pacific Ocean, but fortunately these plans were thwarted by their arrest.

The President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection

In view of those continuing threats, the President has established the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP). The infrastructures include energy, financial, telecommunications, transportation and water systems, continuity of government, and emergency services such as medical, police, fire and rescue. These critical infrastructures are the life support systems of our society. They give us pure water, safe highways and airways, reliable energy, instant communications, and secure financial transactions.

The President defined these threats as: first, physical threats to tangible property; and, second, threats of electronic, radio-frequency or computer-based attacks on information or communications components that control critical infrastructures, known as “cyber threats.”

The Commission is composed of twenty Commissioners. Its Chairman is Robert Marsh, a former 4-star Air Force General and the former Chairman of the Board of a Fortune 500 company. Commissioners were nominated by each of the following ten Federal agencies:

Department of Commerce
Department of Defense
Department of Energy
Department of Justice
Department of Transportation
Department of the Treasury
Central Intelligence Agency
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Federal Emergency Management Agency
National Security Agency

One commissioner from each of the agencies will be from outside the Federal Government to emphasize the need for cooperation between the government and private sectors. Also, the President is now in the process of establishing a fifteen-member Advisory Committee composed of representatives from the private sector. Building a partnership between the public and private sectors is the core of the Commission’s work. As Henry Ford said: “Coming together is a beginning; keeping together is progress; working together is success.”

The basic mission of the Commission is to advise and assist the President by recommending a national strategy for protecting and assuring critical infrastructures. The Commission will identify physical and cyber threats, consider vulnerabilities, and develop policy and legislative options necessary to effect the recommendations. The Commission will file its report with the President on October 13 of this year and then await his response.

Local Officials

The Commission and the California Utilities Emergency Association (CUEA) have a great deal in common in our efforts to enhance our critical infrastructures.

America’s utilities are among our most critical infrastructures, and the work of CUEA is in the vanguard of efforts to assure their continued high performance. We hope that the work of CUEA will be duplicated in other states which have not yet established similar organizations. We urge that CUEA increase its focus on means to address the cyber threats of its members.

The members of your Association are the ones closest to the scene in responding to threats or damage to our critical infrastructures. How can their role be made more effective? How can we build more efficient means to share threat and vulnerability information with local officials and the private sector?

There are few jurisdictions in which the first responders feel adequately trained and equipped to meet chemical, biological and radiological incidents. They often do not have the sensors to identify their encounters with such agents. They often do not have adequate decontamination equipment or adequate protective gear to assure their own safety in dealing with such an incident.

How can Federal agencies provide increased training to assist local officials in responding to such incidents? Should specialized equipment be furnished to assist in detection, mitigation and recovery?

Much of the information that controls critical infrastructures such as energy and telecommunications is transmitted through computers, i.e., through the public telephone net, and increasingly, the Internet. Yet there are no uniform standards governing this service. Should standards be established? Who should establish them? What should the standards be, and how might they be enforced? Or, should they be voluntary like the seal of approval of the Underwriters’ Laboratory?

Conclusion

We welcome and encourage your input. The toughest work of the Commission is still before it — the actual crafting of strategy — so we want to hear what you have to say as soon as possible. That’s the only way we can devise solutions that work for everyone.

We must never forget that in this age, as in all ages, success is determined by the ability to cope with change. As Thomas Stearns Eliot observed:

Last season’s fruit is eaten
And the full-fed beast shall kick the empty pail.
For last year’s words belong to last year’s language
And next year’s words await another voice.

Working together, we can solve these pressing problems. It will take good minds, high dedication, and perseverance.

NEW ZEALAND: HACKERS PAY NO HEED TO CHAOS THEY MIGHT CAUSE.

Posted by Kuji on June 26th, 2008

12Aug98 NEW ZEALAND: HACKERS PAY NO HEED TO CHAOS THEY MIGHT CAUSE.
By SUSAN JENNISON.

Kuji hacked computer systems for the same intellectual kick others get
from completing cryptic crosswords or solving mind teasers. For hackers
it is a numbers game with no thought to the possible enormity of the
consequences. The dangers are not real and do not equate to physical
things; cars, buildings or disasters.

Kuji – the codename used by Mathew Bevan when he was active – and the
Datastream Cowboy (Richard Pryce) managed to provoke an investigation by
the United States Air Force and Scotland Yard’s computer crime unit after
hacking into the Pentagon computer in 1993. Their inspiration then was to
learn more about UFOs.

Despite more sophisticated security systems, the talented amateurs still
get in.

The hackers who hit India’s national security computer system at the
Bhabba Atomic Research Centre had political motives. All aged between 15
and 18 and codenamed the MilwOrm Group, they claimed to be protesting
against the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in May this
year.

Team Jajis threatened the New York Times and CyberTimes and in April an
Israeli teenager broke into the Pentagon’s computer system, a repeat
performance of Mathew Bevan who breached that system when he was 18. The
costs for computer security can be awesome.

United States industry estimates the costs of keeping the intruders at bay
at $US10 billion ($19.68 billion) while the Pentagon alone had 25,000
hacker attacks last year.

Bevan, now employed to test computer security for private firms, says
hackers are not out to cause chaos, they are looking for acceptance, kudos
and fame amongst their peers. Frequently it is just an amusing game of
breaking codes and challenging authority.

The unauthorised access or trespassing and vandalism to software are often
secondary to their considerations.

Mathew Bevan’s view is that hackers are generally the tinkerers, the
people who at school, wanted to ask the questions the teachers could never
answer. Meta-hackers have other aims: they are commissioned to steal
information. This information is then res

THE SCHOOLBOY SPY. Sunday Times

Posted by Kuji on June 26th, 2008

04/04/98 THE SCHOOLBOY SPY.

By Jonathan Ungoed-Thomas

The Americans called him their No 1 enemy, but he was only 16. Jonathan Ungoed-Thomas reveals one of the strangest stories of the cyber-age. On the evening of April 15, 1994, six American special agents sat in a concrete basement at a secret air force base patiently waiting for an attack. Their unseen and unknown enemy had for weeks been rampaging across the Pentagon network of computers, cracking security codes and downloading secret files.

Defence officials feared the infiltrator was a foreign agent. They were monitoring his movements in a desperate effort to trace him to his lair. He had first been spotted by a systems manager at the Rome Laboratory at the Griffiss air base in New York state, the premier command and control research facility in the United States. He had breached the security system and was using assumed computer identities from the air base to attack other sites, including Nasa, Wright-Patterson air force base – which monitors UFO sightings – and Hanscom air force base in Massachusetts. He was also planting “sniffer files” to pick up every password used in the system. This was a new type of warfare, a “cyber attack” at the heart of the most powerful military machine on earth. But the American military had been preparing for “cyber war” and it had a new breed of agent ready to fight back against the infiltrator. Computer specialists from the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) and the Air Force Information Warfare Centre in San Antonio, Texas, were dispatched to Rome Laboratory to catch the attacker.

By the end of the second week of their attempt to outwit him, their windowless basement room was a mess of food wrappers, sleeping bags and empty Coca-Cola cans. Sitting among the debris, the American cyber agents saw a silent alarm throb on one of the many terminals packed into the 30ft by 30ft room. Datastream Cowboy, as he called himself, was online again. They carefully tracked him on a computer screen as he used the access code of a high-ranking Pentagon employee to sign on. This gave him the power to delete files, copy secret information and even crash the system. As he sifted through battlefield simulation data, artificial intelligence files and reports on Gulf war weaponry, the agents worked frantically at their terminals, trying yet again to establish who he was and where he had come from. It was futile. Datastream Cowboy always bounced around the world before launching an attack and it was impossible even to establish in which country he was sitting.

Suddenly he left the Pentagon system. The agents rapidly checked the computer address of his new target and were chilled by the result: he was trying to get access to a nuclear facility somewhere in Korea. The shocked agents saw a terrible crisis coming. The United States was embroiled in tense negotiations with North Korea about its suspected nuclear weapons programme. The Clinton administration was publicly split between a faction that wanted to punish the Stalinist regime in Pyongyang for attempting to develop a nuclear bomb and State Department diplomats who insisted on a gentler approach.

If the paranoid North Koreans detected a computer attack on their nuclear facility from an American air base – because Datastream Cowboy had assumed an American military identity by routeing his assault through the Griffiss computer – they would be bound to believe that the hawks had won and this was an act of war. Senior defence officials were hurriedly briefed as the agents attempted to establish the exact location in Korea of the computer that Datastream Cowboy was trying to crack.

After several tense hours, they had their answer. His target was in South Korea, not North. The security alert was over, but the damage meted out by Datastream Cowboy was not. In the space of a few weeks he had caused more harm than the KGB, in the view of the American military, and was the “No 1 threat to US security”.

What made Datastream Cowboy so dangerous, in the view of the Americans, was that he was not alone; he was working with a more sophisticated hacker who used the “handle” of Kuji. The agents repeatedly watched Datastream Cowboy unsuccessfully attack a military site and retreat for an e-mail briefing from Kuji. He would then return and successfully hack into the site. Both Datastream Cowboy and Kuji were untraceable. They were weaving a path through computer systems in South Africa, Mexico and Europe before launching their attacks. Over 26 days, Datastream Cowboy and Kuji broke into the Rome Laboratory more than 150 times. Kuji was also monitored attempting an assault on the computers at Nato headquarters near Brussels. It was only three years after the final collapse of Soviet communism, but there was already a strong fear within the American government that the United States had become vulnerable to a new military threat: electronic and computer warfare.

Both America’s superpower military arsenal and its huge civilian economy had become reliant on microchips and in the words of Jamie Gorelick, a deputy attorney-general: “Some day we will wake up to find that the electronic equivalent of Pearl Harbor has crippled our computer networks and caused more chaos than a well placed nuclear strike. We do not want to wait for that wake-up call.”

What made the American military so vulnerable was that the Internet – the computer communications system that had been developed by Pentagon scientists as a tool for survival after nuclear war – was opening up in 1994 to anyone in the world who had access to a cheap and powerful personal computer.

The Internet automatically brought hackers to the very gates of the Pentagon’s most secret files – and it could not be policed, as it had been deliberately set up without controls to ensure ease of access for nuclear survivors.

According to official American figures, the Pentagon’s military computers are now suffering cyber attacks at the rate of 250,000 a year and it is retaliating with a $3.6bn programme of computer protection to key systems. THE attacks by Datastream Cowboy and Kuji were the opening shots in this barrage, and the Pentagon generals insisted that they had to be found and put out of action. It would have been relatively simple to shut them out of the Pentagon network, but they would survive to attack again – and their identities and the information they had already stolen would have remained unknown. The American cyber agents were ordered to continue chasing them through the electronic maze.

But how? They used a process called “fingering” in which they tried to detect every computer that Datastream Cowboy had used as stepping stones before attacking them. A computer on the Internet gives its own address in the first few bytes of any communication and the agents tried to trace Datastream Cowboy’s path backwards. The process can often be hit and miss because of the vast amount of traffic on the Internet and the hacker’s path was simply too long and circuitous to follow to its end. The agents almost gave up hope. Then old-fashioned police work was brought to bear. In the cyber age, where do hackers hang out? On the Internet, of course. They “chat” with each other through their screens.

The agents had informants who cruised the Internet and one of these made the breakthrough. He found that Datastream Cowboy hung out at Cyberspace, an Internet “service provider” based in Seattle. Moreover, he was a particularly chatty individual who was eager to engage other hackers in e-mail conversation. Naive, too. Before long, the informant had established that Datastream Cowboy lived in the United Kingdom. He even gave out his home telephone number.

Jubilant, a senior AFOSI agent contacted the computer crime unit in Scotland Yard for assistance. Datastream Cowboy’s number was traced to a house in a cul-de-sac in Colindale, part of the anonymous north London suburbs. In cold war days it would have been a classic address for a spy’s hideaway.

Telephone line checks revealed that the hacker was first dialling into Bogota, the Colombian capital, and then using a free phone line from there to hack his way into the sensitive military sites.

American agents flew to London and staked out the address with British police officers. Detectives were cautious, however, about making an immediate arrest because they wanted Datastream Cowboy to be online when they entered the house, so that he would be caught in the act.

At 8pm on May 12, 1994, four unmarked cars were parked outside the Colindale house. Inside one of them, a detective’s mobile phone rang. An agent from the Rome Laboratory was on the other end: Datastream Cowboy was online. Officers made a second call to British Telecom in Milton Keynes and established that a free phone call was being made to South America. Posing as a courier, one of the officers knocked on the door. As it was opened by a middle-aged man, eight policemen silently appeared and swept into the house. The officers quietly searched the downstairs and first floor. Then, creeping up the stairs to a loft-room, they saw a teenager hunched in his chair tapping frantically away on the keyboard of his ?700 PC World computer. They had found Datastream Cowboy.

One of the detectives walked up silently behind the young suspect and gently removed his hands from the computer. For 16-year-old Richard Pryce, a music student, it was the shock of his life. He looked at the policemen as they prepared to arrest him and collapsed on the floor in tears.

“They thought they were going to find a super-criminal and they just found me, a teenager playing around on his computer,” says Pryce now. “My mother had noticed people sitting outside our house for a few days beforehand, but I didn’t think much of it. I never thought I would get caught and it was very disturbing when I did.

“It had just been a game or a challenge from which I had got a real buzz. It was unbelievable because the computers were so easy to hack, like painting by numbers.”

Pryce, who was then a pupil at The Purcell School in Harrow, Middlesex, was arrested at his home but released on police bail the same evening. Five stolen files, including a battle simulation program, were discovered on the hard disk of his computer. Another stolen file, which dealt with artificial intelligence and the American Air Order of Battle, was too large to fit on to his desktop computer. So he had placed it in his own storage space at an Internet service provider that he used in New York, accessing it with a personal password.

During the subsequent police interviews, one pressing question remained unanswered: who was Kuji? Pryce claimed he had only talked with his hacking mentor on the Internet and did not know where he lived. American investigators regarded Kuji as a far more sophisticated hacker than Datastream. He would only stay on a telephone for a short time, not long enough to be traced successfully. “Kuji assisted and mentored Datastream and in return received from Datastream stolen information…Nobody knows what Kuji did with this information or why it was being collected,” agents reported.

Mark Morris, who was then a detective sergeant with Scotland Yard’s computer crime unit, was one of the investigating officers on the case. “It was awesome that Pryce, who was just one teenager with a computer, could cause so much havoc, but the greater worry in the US was about Kuji,” says Morris. “The fear was that he could be a spy working for a hostile foreign power. The job was then to find him.”

Pryce did give detectives one telephone number, but it was a red herring: a school library in Surrey. During the next two years of compiling evidence in Britain and America in the case against Pryce, British detectives and American agents failed to turn up any evidence that might lead to Kuji. Their break finally came in June 1996 when the computer crime unit decided to sift once again through the mass of information on the hard disk of Pryce’s computer.

Morris took on the job. “I was at home with my laptop and went through every bit of that hard disk, which was a huge task.” It took him three weeks. If all the files had been printed out they would have filled 40 filing cabinets.

At last he found what he wanted. “At the bottom of a file in the DOS directory I saw the name Kuji. Next to the name was a telephone number. Pryce might not have even known it was on his system because he downloaded so much information.”

For American agents hoping to catch a superspy, Kuji’s telephone number was a grave disappointment. He was based in Cardiff. A team of officers drove up to his address, a terraced house, and finally discovered Kuji’s identity. He was 21-year-old Mathew Bevan, a soft-spoken computer worker with a fascination for science fiction. His bedroom wall was covered with posters from The X Files and one of his consuming interests was the Roswell incident, the alleged crash of a UFO near Roswell, New Mexico, in July 1947. He was arrested on June 21, 1996, at the offices of Admiral Insurance where he worked.

“I would never have been caught if it wasn’t for Pryce and even then they took two years to find me,” Bevan says now. “And the only reason Pryce got caught was that he gave his number to a secret service informant.” Bevan, the son of a police officer, said he had not even been alarmed when Datastream Cowboy disappeared from the Internet. “Everyone was joking with me on the e-mail that he must have been arrested, but I didn’t believe it. It wasn’t until a year later that a friend phoned me and said: ‘Have you seen the papers? They think you’re a spy’.”

However, Bevan became confident that he had escaped detection and was stunned when he was arrested. “I was told to go and check the managing director’s computer. I went in and there were seven or eight of them in suits and I was arrested.” He was charged the next day with two counts of conspiracy under the Criminal Law Act 1997. He was later charged with three offences under the Computer Misuse Act 1990.

Pryce had been charged in June 1995, about 13 months after his arrest, with 12 offences under Section 1 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990. He was also charged with conspiracy three days before Bevan’s arrest. At the culmination of one of the biggest ever international computer crime investigations and after a massive security scare in the United States, law enforcers were left with a meagre and faintly embarrassing prize: two young hackers who in their spare time, from the comfort of their bedrooms, had penetrated what should have been the most secure defence network in the world. To rub salt into the wounds, their credentials were hardly impressive. Pryce had scraped a D grade in computer studies at A-level and Bevan had dropped out of an HND course in computer science.

Pryce’s father, Nick, who restores musical instruments, said: “They said Richard was a No 1 security threat and I think that was just rubbish. They had overreacted and when they found out it was just a teenager, they still wanted to try to make an example of him. I never knew what he was doing at the time; I just thought he was in his bedroom playing on his computer. When I found out, I never thought he had done anything particularly wrong and neither did our friends. He just showed how bad security was on those computers.”

But how did two rather ordinary young men manage to penetrate the Pentagon computer system and spark such a massive security alert? Both were bright and articulate, but there was nothing in their backgrounds to suggest a computer wizardry that would outwit the American military. Their success was based on a mixture of persistence and good luck, which was abetted by crude security mistakes in the Pentagon computer system. Pryce had had a musical upbringing with his two sisters, Sally and Katie, and had a passion for playing the double bass. He was bought his computer when he was 15 to help him in his studies. He would spend his spare time linked up to a bulletin board on the Internet, where computer users traded information and chatted. It was here that he got his first introduction to hacking.

“I used to get software off the bulletin boards and from one of them I got a ‘bluebox’, which could recreate the various frequencies to get free phonecalls,” he said. “I would phone South America and this software would make noises which would make the operator think I had hung up. I could then make calls anywhere in the world for free.”

Now 20 and in his third year at the Royal College of Music in London, Pryce said: “I would get on to the Internet and there would be hackers’ forums where I learnt the techniques and picked up the software I needed. You also get text files explaining what you can do to different types of computer. “It was just a game, a challenge. I was amazed at how good I got at it. It escalated very quickly from being able to hack a low-profile computer like a university to being able to hack a military system. The name Datastream Cowboy just came to me in a flash of inspiration.”

The attack on Rome Laboratory, his greatest success, relied on a ferret called Carmen. Pryce easily gained low-level security access to the Rome computer using a default guest password. Once inside the system, he retrieved the password file and downloaded it on to his computer. He then set up a program to bombard the password file with 50,000 words a second. “I just left the computer running overnight until it cracked it,” he explained.

If all the air force officers with access to the computer had followed orders and used passwords with a mixture of numerals and letters, his attack would have been foiled; but luck was on his side.

Morris, who has since left Scotland Yard’s computer crime unit and now works in London for Computer Forensic Investigations, a private company, revealed: “He managed to crack the file because a lieutenant in the USAF had used the password Carmen. It was the name of his pet ferret. Once Pryce had got that, he was free to roam the system. There was information there that was deemed classified and highly confidential and he was able to see it.”

Once he was in the system, Pryce kept getting access to higher levels in his aim to become a “root user”, which gives the hacker total control of the computer with the power to shut out other users and command the entire system.

“I was interested in Rome Labs because I knew they developed stuff for the military. I just wanted to find out what they were doing. I read that UFO material was being kept at Wright Patterson base and I thought it would also be a laugh to get in there. I also hacked into a Nasa site,” he said. “Rome Labs was my main project. I got the programming code for an artificial intelligence project. I downloaded files so I could view them at leisure at home.

“I know there was a big fuss when I tried to hack into a computer in Korea, but there was nothing sinister about it. I just fancied having a go at a different sort of computer and I happened to be on the Rome Laboratory computer. I just tapped in the address for the Korean research computer, but I didn’t hack into it. It never went further than that.” During an intensive three months of hacking, Pryce sent e- mails at least twice a week to the fellow hacker he knew as Kuji, without knowing his real name was Mathew Bevan.

Bevan, who is now 23, was more of a loner than Pryce and would spend up to 30 hours without a break on his computer. He claims the fraternity of hackers gave him the friendship that he had failed to find during his childhood. “I was bullied at school and I found my little community and interaction through my computer,” he said. “The hackers would all egg each other on. There wasn’t anything malicious about it. If there was, I could have downed as many computer systems as I wanted. I was just really looking for anything about UFOs. It was like war games; I just couldn’t believe what we could get into. I wasn’t tutoring Pryce, but the Americans made out I was because they thought I was some kind of east European masterspy.” Pryce agrees: “We embarrassed them by showing how lax their security was and that’s why they made out we had been a huge security threat. I’m now amazed by what I did, but I wasn’t surprised at the time. It was just my hobby. Some people watched television for six hours a day, I hacked computers.”

The first time Pryce and Bevan met in person was in July 1996 when they appeared at Bow Street magistrates court jointly charged with conspiracy and offences under the Computer Misuse Act. “He was at the back of the court when I went in and his mother said: ‘You’d better say hello’, which he did. We didn’t even have a chat,” said Bevan.

Conspiracy charges against both Pryce and Bevan were later dropped, but in March last year Pryce was fined ?1,200 after admitting 12 offences under the Computer Misuse Act. His lawyers said in mitigation that there had been some exaggeration when the Senate armed services committee had been told in 1996 that the Datastream Cowboy had caused more harm than the KGB and was the “No 1 threat to US security”. The remaining charges against Bevan were dropped in November after the Crown Prosecution Service decided it was not in the public interest to pursue the case.

Nevertheless, the case of Datastream Cowboy and Kuji remains one of the most notorious in American cyber history. The two young men are living this down in different ways. Pryce’s computer was confiscated, to his initial dismay. “After I had my computer taken away it was quite difficult because I had been doing it every night for a year,” he said. “If they hadn’t caught me, I would have carried on.” Now he thinks hacking was a waste of time and insists he will never do it again. He does not even own a computer any more.

Bevan, however, has put his notoriety to good use: he is now employed testing the computer security of private companies.Targeting the Pentagon United States defence computers have for years been one of the most covetedtargets for hacking addicts inspired by the film War Games, which showed a boy cracking an American defence network and nearly starting the third world war.

One of the pioneers of this craze was Kevin Mitnick, who repeatedly hacked into Pentagon computers in the mid-1980s. He was jailed in 1989 but continued his exploits on his release and was arrested again after a two-year hunt by the FBI. The number of cyber attacks on the Pentagon is estimated by Washington officials as 250,000 annually, but the incidents the public hears about are only the few where hackers get caught. In 1996 six Danes who hacked into Pentagon computers were given sentences of up to three months. The same year, special agents tracked down three teenage hackers in Croatia who had also succeeded in penetrating Pentagon computers.

They were never identified or charged, however, as there is no law against computer hacking in Croatia. Last month there was a spectacular example of the hackers’ work when American defence officials revealed that the Pentagon computer network had been subjected to a relentless two-month attack. CIA agents were reportedly anxious that the hackers might be the agents of Saddam Hussein.

FBI agents blamed a secret convention of hackers believed to be held in New York. A few days ago, the real culprit gave himself up. Ehud Tenenbaum, an Israeli teenager who dubbed himself The Analyser, had worked with two young hackers in California. Under house arrest in Tel Aviv, he said the attacks were not malicious. He had concentrated on American government sites because he hated organisations. “Chaos, I think it is a nice idea,” he said.

(c) Times Newspapers Ltd, 1998.

SUNDAY TIMES 29/03/98

Infowar.Com & Interpact, Inc. WebWarrior@Infowar.Com

Submit articles to: infowar@infowar.com
Voice: 813.393.6600 Fax: 813.393.6361

Last modified: Sun, 03 Jan 1999 00:04:46 GMT

US Info Warriors crap out in Crown Court – Crypt Newsletter

Posted by Kuji on June 26th, 2008

“The cream of US military intelligence last week had their bungled attempt to prosecute a bedroom hacker thrown out by a British court,” screamed the lead of a November 28, 1997 piece in the United Kingdom newspaper, The Guardian.

Computer Ace Cleared, *PA News*

Posted by Kuji on June 26th, 2008

[Source: Lucie Morris, Security Risk Claim Computer Ace Cleared, *PA News*,21 Nov 1997; PGN Abstracting]

[DMK: Two of the best publications regarding the Rome Air Force Base
hack-ins are the GAO Report available online through
http://www.gao.gov/reports.htm under title [AIMD-96-92] Information
Security: Computer Attacks at Department of Defense Pose Increasing Risks
and the Fall 96 Computer Security Institute’s journal, both articles written
in whole or in part by Jim Christy, the Air Force investigator involved.
Mixed messages. Is the interpretation to be, if you hack, you’ll get off?

Or if you hack some other country’s computers, you won’t be prosecuted
because it costs too much? Of if your partner in crime gets off with just a
fine, prosecutors won’t spend a lot of money going after you?
So Bevan *may* have hacked into computers worldwide. But he has no
convictions. How long until he’s peddling his skills as a computer security
expert, or even on a “Tiger Team” or penetration testing group?]

Dave Kennedy [CISSP] Director of Research, National Computer Security Assoc.



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